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ABSTRACT18
Willingness to lay down one’s life for a group of non-kin, well documented historically and ethnographically, represents an
evolutionary puzzle. Building on research in social psychology, we develop a mathematical model showing how conditioning
cooperation on previous shared experience can allow individually costly pro-group behavior to evolve. The model generates a
series of predictions that we then test empirically in a range of special sample populations (including military veterans, college
fraternity/sorority members, football fans, martial arts practitioners, and twins). Our empirical results show that sharing painful
experiences produces “identity fusion” – a visceral sense of oneness – which in turn can motivate self-sacrifice, including
willingness to fight and die for the group. Practically, our account of how shared dysphoric experiences produce identity fusion
helps us better understand such pressing social issues as suicide terrorism, holy wars, sectarian violence, gang-related
violence, and other forms of intergroup conflict.
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Introduction20
Across the historical and ethnographic records, from warriors and soldiers to suicide bombers and religious martyrs, humans21
have proven capable of not just cooperating within groups, but of making extremely costly personal sacrifices for them. While22
altruism towards kin is well understood evolutionarily1,2 extreme self-sacrifice for the sake of non-kin still represents a puzzle.23
Psychologists have offered a range of explanations for how threatening experiences can trigger increased groupishness,3–1024
but these do not address willingness to make the ultimate sacrifice in defense of a group. There is little evidence that such sac-25
rifices, including suicide terrorism, are linked to psychopathology.11 Rather, a growing body of experimental evidence suggest26
that willingness to fight and die for the group may be motivated by “identity fusion” – a normal (i.e., not psychopathological)27
form of group alignment in which the boundary between personal and social identity becomes porous, producing a visceral28
sense of oneness with the group.12–17 Driven by the conviction that group members share essence with oneself in ways that29
can transcend even the bonds of kinship, persons strongly fused to a group report willingness to engage in self-sacrifice. The30
form that self-sacrifice takes may vary widely in different cultures and historical periods but we argue that one of the pathways31
to extreme pro-group action, whatever culturally distinctive forms it happens to take, is identity fusion. The identity fusion32
construct builds on a classic theoretical tradition in psychology – social identity theory.18 Initial construct validation studies33
found that strongly fused individuals report perceiving shared essential qualities with a group as well as a sense of reciprocal34
strength.19 The identity fusion construct is well grounded in theory and has demonstrated high predictive validity across35
dozens of experiments, cross-sectional surveys, and longitudinal studies with specialist populations as diverse as revolution-36
ary fighters,20 victims of atrocities,21 and civilians loyal to their country.22,23 Overall researchers have shown that identity37
fusion is a cause of extreme cooperation across cultures, in contrast with the less extreme forms of cooperation motivated by38
1
identification (alignment with a group category) and ethnic psychology (the acquisition, storage, and deployment of socially39
learned group identity markers).22, 2440
One explanation for the extreme cooperation caused by identity fusion is that groupmates are perceived as “psychological41
kin”,15,24 i.e. that human brain, while “wired” for sacrificial behavior towards close kin, makes “mistakes” by facilitating42
pro-group behavior irrespective of genetic relatedness. The impetus for self-sacrifice by group members is often couched in43
the language of kinship; and empirical studies show that the effects of identity fusion on pro-national outcomes is partially44
mediated by feelings of family-like ties toward fellow countrymen.21,22, 25, 26 Various religious, military, and terrorist orga-45
nizations attempt to promote self-sacrifice by exploiting these kin-related instincts.27 Although kin selection represents a46
powerful driver of many biological phenomena,1,2 the “psychological kin” explanation is not completely satisfactory. First, it47
is difficult to imagine how biological mechanisms underlying the“psychological kin” phenomenon could evolve given low ge-48
netic relatedness in ancestral human groups (and in our closest relatives – chimpanzees)28,29 and high costs of self-sacrificial49
behavior. Second, mechanisms for kin detection in humans15,30 should act against perceiving unrelated persons as close bio-50
logical relatives. Finally, in a recent survey of participants in the Libyan uprising of 2011, thousands of whom died in combat,51
frontline fighters were more likely to choose genetically unrelated fellow revolutionaries in preference to family as the group52
with which they are most fused.20 Therefore alternatives to the “psychological kin” explanation need to be explored.53
Recent psychological research provides preliminary evidence that a powerful cause of identity fusion is sharing expe-54
riences, especially dysphoric (painful and frightening) ones, with group members.15,20, 22, 24 Dysphoric experiences may55
become entrenched as self-defining memories that similarly define fellow group members (Fig 1). This mechanism of group56
solidarity is inherently more extreme, and powerful, than oft-cited forms of group commitment such as identification,31 which57
have been reliably associated with collective euphoria and group performance.32 Research indicates that when the group is58
threatened, fused persons override self-preservation concerns to protect the group at any cost.1559
This proximate explanation for self-sacrifice motivates us to explore the evolutionary implications of conditioning coop-60
eration on shared past experience. We posit that willingness to perform costly acts for the group is a behavioral strategy61
that evolved in our ancestors to enable success in high-risk collective activities and between-group conflicts. Groups whose62
members fused together after experiencing shared dysphoria (i.e., events that negatively impact fitness) would be more likely63
to prevail in subsequent between-group conflicts in spite of their handicap. Ancestral groups that did not fuse when experienc-64
ing shared dysphoria would be less likely to survive in between-group competition. In benign conditions, the willingness to65
sacrifice for the group would be too costly to sustain. As such, identity fusion should be sensitive to cues of shared dysphoria66
within the group and to threats imposed from outside the group. Our explanation of individually-costly but group-beneficial67
behavior thus focuses on evolved coalitionary psychology and tribal instincts33,34 but emphasizes genetic rather than cultural68
effects and conditional rather than unconditional expression of self-sacrifice. Here we provide systematic and robust model-69
ing and empirical tests for our explanatory framework. First we investigate theoretically whether conditioning cooperation70
on types of shared experience can evolve by natural selection. On these grounds we then test the predictions of our models71
empirically, via correlational, quasi-experimental, and experimental studies. Our findings support the hypothesis that shared72
dysphoric experiences produce identity fusion and this in turn predicts willingness to fight and die for the group.73
Results74
Mathematical models and theoretical predictions75
Our models included many of the standard assumptions of theoretical approaches to within-group cooperation in evolution-76
ary biology. We treated individual willingness to cooperate with group-mates as a genetically controlled trait.1, 2 Individual77
fitness was determined by an outcome of a collective goods game35 that the group members participate in. Collective action78
of group members can be thwarted by free-riding;36 this problem can be solved to some extent by kin selection, reciprocity,79
punishment, or group selection.37–39 Here we offer a novel solution – conditioning cooperation on shared prior experience.80
In our model, some groups facing a collective action previously had fitness enhancing experiences while others had fitness81
decreasing experiences. Below we show that conditioning individual efforts in a collective action on these qualities of previ-82
ously shared experience can evolve by natural selection and can help to solve the free-riding problem. Our model predicts that83
groups undergoing fitness-decreasing experiences are more likely to contribute substantially to future collective actions. That84
is, shared past negative experiences can augment future pro-group behavior increasing the overall fitness of both the group85
and its individual members. Our results however predict a particular evolved social psychology that biases humans to greatly86
increase cooperation if their groups go through shared negative experiences.87
Models. More specifically, we considered a population of individuals living in a large number G of groups of constant88
size n. Generations are discrete and non-overlapping. We focused on a single collective action35,40, 41 that groups attempt89
to accomplish. The effort of individual i in group j towards the group’s success in the collective action was modeled as90
a nonnegative continuous variable zi j; the total group j effort of is Zj = ∑i zi j. We defined the individual payoff from the91
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collective action as92
fi j = 1+bPj− czi j, (1)
where b and c are constant benefit and cost parameters. Function Pj = Pj(Zj) gives the normalized value of the resource93
produced by group j as a result of collective effort; we normalize Pj relative to a maximum possible reward size (0≤ Pj ≤ 1).94
Relative individual fertility was proportional to fi j/ f j, where f j is the average payoff in group j.95
There are two general types of collective actions in which our ancestors were almost certainly engaged. The first includes96
group activities such as defense from predators, some types of hunting or food collection, use of fire, etc. The success of97
a particular group in these activities largely does not depend on the actions of neighboring groups. We will refer to such98
collective actions as “us vs. nature” contests and define the relative success as99
Pj =
Zj
Z j+Z0
(2a)
Ref.41,42 Here Z0 is a “half-saturation” constant; the larger Z0, the more group effort Zj is needed for the success. The second100
type of collective action, which we will refer to as “us vs. them” contests, includes direct conflicts and/or competition with101
other groups over territory and other resources such as mating. The success of one group in an “us vs. them” contest means102
failure or reduced success for other groups. In these contests, we defined the relative success as103
Pj =
Zj
∑k Zk
(2b)
where the sum is over all groups.43,44 We studied “us vs. nature” and “us vs. them” contests separately. Our formulation104
implied there was an incentive to free-ride on the efforts of group-mates.35,36 The collective action models introduced above105
belong to a general class of the Volunteer dilemmas,45,46 where individuals would prefer to free-ride on the effort of their106
group-mates but if nobody else is willing to do it, it may become advantageous to volunteer in spite of the costs involved. It107
is important to realize that in our models, individuals make contributions to a collective good not because they are “altruistic”108
but because this increases their fitness.109
We extended the above standard model by assuming that groups differ in previous experience which both contributes to the110
overall probability of the group’s survival and can potentially condition individual cooperation. Specifically, we posited that111
a random proportion π of the groups previously had an euphoric (that is, payoff-increasing) experience whereas a proportion112
1−π had a dysphoric (that is, payoff-decreasing) experience. For example, one can think of an “endowment” (e.g. a forest113
with fruits, or pigs) that the group has initially but may lose because of some random exogenous effects. The loss of the114
endowment would then represent a dysphoric event experienced by all group members. The previous experience (specified115
by an indicator variable Ej = 1 for euphoric groups and to 0 for dysphoric groups) and the relative success Pj in the focal116
collective action jointly controlled the group’s survival probability which is set to be proportional to117
S j = hEj+(1−h)Pj. (3)
Here 0 ≤ h ≤ 1 is a constant parameter measuring the importance of the previous experience for the group’s survival. The118
equation above uses a simple linear function to specify how previous experience (shared by all group members by assumption)119
affects group survival. In our model, given everything else the same, the probability of group survival S in “euphoric” groups120
is larger by h than that in “dysphoric” groups (Seuphoric = h+(1−h)P,Sdisphoric = (1−h)P)). Groups that did not survive were121
replaced by the offspring of surviving groups (see Methods and the Supplementary Information, SI). In our model, group-level122
selection favors large individual efforts zi j (which would increase the probability of group survival S j), while individual-level123
selection may favor low efforts zi j (which would reduce the individual costs term czi j).47, 48124
We assumed that previous experience not only controlled the group’s survival probability, but could also potentially in-125
fluence individual efforts in the collective action, by triggering different behavioral modules. Specifically we postulated two126
independent (unlinked) loci with allelic effects xi j and yi j, the first of which was expressed in individuals with euphoric expe-127
rience, so that in such individuals zi j = xi j, and the second was expressed in individuals with dysphoric experience, so that in128
such individuals zi j = yi j. In each individual, only one gene was expressed, and all individuals from the same group expressed129
the same gene. Initially, the allelic effects in both genes in all individuals were very close to zero and the individuals did130
not contribute much to the collective action. We allowed for mutation, recombination, and migration. We were interested131
in whether gene effects would increase over time and whether the increase would be similar or asymmetric between the two132
genes, that is, whether individuals would condition their cooperation on shared past experience.133
Our model operated on an evolutionary time-scale focusing on genetic changes leading to the evolution of pro-social134
behavior conditioned on shared past experience. Individuals’ feelings underlying the development of identity fusion during135
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the individual’s life-time were not modeled explicitly. However, to the extent that identity fusion mediates the relationship136
between shared past experience and future pro-group actions of an individual (as we show below experimentally), our results137
also concern the effects of shared experience on identity fusion.138
Results and predictions. To study our models we used both analytical approximations (shown in the SI) and individual-139
based simulations. To remove the effects of genetic relatedness, groups were formed randomly at the beginning of each140
generation. We measured the averages of euphoric x and dysphoric y efforts across the whole system at a (stochastic) equilib-141
rium state to which the system evolves. Fig 2 illustrates the effects of five different parameters on the contribution to collective142
action in the two contests in euphoric and dysphoric groups (see also the SI). Overall, our results lead to the following predic-143
tions. First, previous shared experience does affect individual behavior in collective action (x and y depend on parameters π144
and h specifying past experience). Second, dysphoric experience makes individuals contribute more than euphoric experience145
(y > x). Third, more intense experience results in stronger effects on prosociality (ratio y/x increases with h). The intuition146
behind these results is very simple: groups in poor initial conditions (e.g. with a reduced endowment or fitness) really need147
to cooperate in order to make it into the future while those in better initial conditions may “afford” somewhat reduced efforts.148
Fourth, the effect of shared dysphoria on prosocial behavior is much stronger if groups compete directly against other groups149
(“us vs. them” contests) than if they cooperate against nature (“us vs. nature” contests). Moreover, the effect is stronger in150
smaller groups (decreasing n increases x and y). The last two predictions are in line with earlier comparisons of “us vs. them”151
and ‘us vs. nature” games.41,42 The explanations are that “us vs. them” games impose stronger selection on the underlying152
genes than “us vs. nature” games41,42 and that free-riding is a more effective strategy in larger populations.36 We expect that153
the effects of the above factors on identity fusion will parallel those on individual actions captured explicitly by our model.154
Our models were designed to study the effects of previous experience in the absence of genetic relatedness between155
group members. We can contrast our results with those for the case when group members are genetically related but the156
effects of previous experience are absent. The corresponding “us vs. nature” and “us vs. them” contests were studied157
previously.41,42 With biologically realistic small values of average genetic relatedness,28 the values predicted by these results158
can be significantly smaller than those observed in Fig 2 (see SI). Of course, we do not know realistic values of some important159
parameters which control the model’s predictions. Nevertheless our results suggest that effects of shared dysphoric experience160
on willingness to perform individually-costly pro-group acts can potentially be stronger than those of genetic relatedness.161
In the models studied above, each individual values the group’s success equally which implies equal degree of identity162
fusion. In the SI we use results from Ref.40 and Ref.41 to show that highly-fused individuals will exhibit more pro-group163
sentiments than low-fused individuals. In particular, under conditions of strong between-group competition the model predicts164
that the efforts of highly-fused individuals will be so high that their fitness will be almost zero. That is, highly-fused individuals165
are predicted to effectively sacrifice themselves for their groups. Ref.15 provides complementary experimental evidence on166
the willingness of such individuals to self-sacrifice for their groups.167
Empirical tests168
Our models make general predictions concerning cooperation in collective actions. Next, we test five specific predictions169
focusing on a particularly interesting and extreme type of cooperation - willingness to self-sacrifice for the group. Because170
we are interested in general behavioral predispositions, we chose a diverse set of samples in eight studies totaling 2,836171
individual participants, including citizens of countries, fans of football teams, military veterans, college fraternity/sorority172
members, martial arts practitioners, and both monozygotic and dyzygotic twins. We ran a total of eight studies, employing173
correlational (Studies 1, 2, 4, 5, 6), quasi-experimental (Studies 1, 3, 8), and experimental (Study 8) methodologies.174
Hypothesis 1: Shared experience promotes willingness to preform extreme pro-group action. We ran two studies to175
test this hypothesis.15 Both studies distinguish everyday experiences from self-defining experiences (i.e., those that are176
vividly remembered and are central to one’s self-concept).49 In Study 1, American participants were more willing to co-177
operate (e.g. donate money, volunteer) to solve problems associated with either a natural disaster (N = 97) or a terrorist178
attack (N = 98) in the United States when they reported sharing more self-defining (r = .239,P = .001) and everyday ex-179
periences (r = .187,P = .009) with fellow Americans. In Study 2, Americans (N = 122) were asked about their willing-180
ness to endorse extreme, self-sacrificial pro-group actions. We also measured participants’ levels of identity fusion with181
their country. Shared experiences increased willingness to endorse extreme pro-group behaviors via increasing identity fu-182
sion. This held for both self-defining experiences, b = .4007(SE = .0655),95%CI[.2842, .5377], and everyday experiences,183
b= .4210(SE = .0733),95%CI[.2925, .5838].184
Hypothesis 2: Shared dysphoric experiences more strongly motivate self-sacrifice for the group than euphoric experiences.185
To test this hypothesis we ran a study on English Premier League football fans (N = 725), a collection of modern ‘tribes’ that186
share dysphoric (e.g. team loss, relegation) and euphoric (e.g. winning cups, embarrassing rivals) experiences.50 In Study 3,187
fans of the losing (i.e., dysphoria-producing) teams were more likely to moralize group-related actions (r = .109,P = .003)188
and choose to sacrifice themselves for the sake of an ingroup member in the classic trolley dilemma (r = .120,P = .001)189
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than fans of winning (i.e., euphoria-producing) teams. The effects of team support on self-sacrificial responses and pro-190
group moral endorsements were both mediated by identity fusion, b = .1216(SE = .0405),95%CI[.0545, .2203] and b =191
.2976(SE = .0687),95%CI[.1632, .4336], respectively. It is possible that high scores on the trolley dilemma reflect tendencies192
to self-harm in response to negative affect. Nevertheless, a more plausible explanation is that shared dysphoria motivates193
extreme cooperation via identity fusion, as high fused individuals of both unsuccessful and successful football teams were194
found to endorse self-sacrificial behaviour. In earlier studies of group competition involving monetary donations rather than195
self-reported endorsement of prosocial acts, losing groups increased their contributions while winning groups decreased it.51, 52196
Hypothesis 3: More intense experiences of shared dysphoria produce stronger effects on self-sacrifice for the group. We197
ran three studies to test this hypothesis. Military veterans vary widely in exposure to shared dysphoric events,53, 54 thus we sur-198
veyed U.S. combat veterans of the VietnamWar (N = 380) in Study 4. As predicted, greater exposure to shared dysphoric com-199
bat experiences (e.g. losing a close co-combatant in battle) predicted both identity fusion (r= .203,P< .0001) and willingness200
to provide support for veterans in need (r= .184,P< .0001). Combat experiences increased willingness to provide support to201
fellow veterans via increasing levels of identity fusion, b= .1026(SE = .0290),95%CI[.0521, .1668]. In Study 5, past and cur-202
rent members (N = 146) of U.S. college fraternities and sororities who had undergone hazing and other such initiation rituals,203
were asked about the extent to which the initiation ritual was self-defining.24 Perceived self-definingness of the experience204
predicted both identity fusion (r= .430,P< .0001) and expressed willingness to sacrifice self for group (r= .429,P< .0001).205
Self-definingness increased pro-group sacrifice by increasing identity fusion, b = .4246(SE = .0839),95%CI[.2704, .6004].206
Similarly, in Study 6, we used online advertisements to recruit Brazilian Jiu Jitsu (BJJ) practitioners (N = 564), as BJJ pro-207
motion events can involve either a painful belt-whipping gauntlet run or less severe practices. This provided an opportunity208
to compare a population with a significant degree of variation in the dysphoric arousal of important affiliative events, which209
practitioners are typically unaware of before joining (62.5% reported having “no idea” about their school’s graduation rituals210
before joining, while a further 16.1% had only “a vague idea”). Despite the significant heterogeneity involved in a worldwide211
sample, we found that the intensity of belt promotions predicted levels of identity fusion (ρ = .135,P= .002), and that identity212
fusion predicted participants’ stated willingness to risk their lives fighting for the club (ρ = .542,P< .0001), as well as their213
willingness to donate time (ρ = .508,P < .0001) and make costly donations of potential prize money (ρ = .250,P < .0001)214
to the club. These relationships remained when controlling for other relevant factors, including age, sex, years training, group215
identification, and average time training per week. Mediation analyses also showed that elevated intensity of experiences216
increased participants’ willingness to endorse pro-group behaviors via increasing levels of identity fusion.217
Hypothesis 4: The effect of shared dysphoria on prosocial behavior is stronger where groups compete directly against218
other groups, rather than if they cooperate against nature. Study 1 (see above) was designed to test hypothesis 4 as well219
as hypothesis 1. In Study 1, we found dysphoric contexts involving terrorists elicited more cooperation than those involving220
natural disasters, t(193) = 2.534,P= .012, Cohen’s d = .363.221
Hypothesis 5: The effects of shared dysphoric experience on the willingness to perform pro-group acts can be stronger222
than those of genetic relatedness. We ran two studies to test this hypothesis. In Study 7, 198 participants either wrote about223
an experience that has shaped them (Experience), genetically transmitted traits (Genes), or the changing seasons (Control).224
Participants then imagined interacting with someone who shared the same experience, discovered a long lost sibling, or225
met a stranger, respectively. Both shared experience (M = 32.17,SD = 27.21) and shared biology (M = 13.66,SD = 17.31)226
increased identity fusion with the person, but shared experiences were a more powerful trigger, P < .001. Both shared227
experiences (M = 3.19,SD = 1.73) and shared genes (M = 2.79,SD = 1.75) similarly predicted trust for the other person,228
P= .173; however, shared genes (M= 4.82,SD= 2.19) predicted economic sacrifice more than shared experiences (M= 4.09,229
SD= 2.11, P= .045). Identity fusion mediated the relationship between shared experiences/genes and prosocial behavior, b=230
1.120/.562 (SE = .2763/.1581), 95%CI [.5967,1.6696/.2783, .8766]. This study partially supports the hypothesis, showing231
that shared experiences predict levels of identity fusion better than shared genes, and levels of trust as well as shared genes.232
In Study 8, 260 monozygotic and 246 dizygotic twins55 were asked about their shared experiences with their twins, as well as233
about how fused they were with their twins. Both zygosity (b= .755 (SE = .173), 95%CI[.415,1.094]) and shared experience234
(b = .267 (SE = .033), 95%CI[.202, .332]) independently predicted identity fusion. Furthermore, hierarchical regression235
analyses showed that shared experience continued to predict identity fusion even after controlling for shared genes.236
Discussion237
Overall our theoretical and empirical studies both suggest that shared dysphoric experiences are a powerful mechanism for238
promoting pro-group behaviors which under certain conditions can be extremely costly to the individuals concerned. Our239
ancestors had a common stake in their group’s fate, especially when facing existential threats. Under threatening conditions,240
having a shared evolutionary future likely was a more decisive factor in cooperation and self-sacrifice than shared ancestry241
(i.e., genetic relatedness). A pervasive source of these threats was highly variable environmental conditions during the Late242
Pleistocene56,57 making adaptation and survival difficult. Another potential source was competition with other human groups243
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for resources and mating opportunities.58–60244
Our model captures explicitly how individual efforts in public good games depend on previous group-shared experience.245
In the model, shared experience has two effects prominent in evolutionary biology and game theory: one on the group survival246
and another on gene expression. We did not model individual emotions and the sense of identity fusion explicitly. (This247
would not be possible.) That is, in the triad experience→identity fusion→action, we model explicitly only experience and248
action. However our experiments as well as earlier work show that identity fusion comes as a “proximate” mediator in the249
experience→action relationship. Therefore, our results also concern the effects of shared experience on identity fusion.250
Previous theoretical research in evolutionary biology has identified a number of mechanisms for the evolution of cooper-251
ation.37–39 Our work brings to light an additional mechanism – conditioning cooperation on shared prior experience. In our252
models, individuals acquire social instincts to contribute to collective actions because this increases their fitness over evolu-253
tionary time. However evolved social instincts may comprise relatively open behaviour programmes that are sensitive to cues254
such as shared dysphoria, leading to high levels of identity fusion and self-sacrificial acts.255
Our proximate explanation for self-sacrifice is that dysphoric experiences and the knowledge that they are shared with the256
group61 shape personal identity and the perception that one’s personal identity is irrevocably tied to the group. The resulting257
state of identity fusion enables simultaneous activation of group and personal identity. In this light, threats to the group258
are experienced as threats to self and the drive to defend the group is consequently a form of self-defense.24 Our empirical259
findings across study groups suggest a consistently robust trend for dysphoria’s role in extreme cooperation, beyond the effects260
of group performance or kinship on cooperation that have previously been documented.261
There has been recent interest in theoretical literature in the effects of variable environment on the evolution of coopera-262
tion62–64 with some studies arguing that populations evolving under harsh environments would become more cooperative. Our263
models are very different in that we consider individual efforts as conditioned on previous group experience. Nevertheless264
there are some parallels in conclusions: we predict that experiencing an instance of a harsh environment would trigger more265
cooperative behavior.266
Our modeling results naturally have a number of limitations. For example, to isolate the effects of previous experience, we267
purposely neglected genetic relatedness by randomly forming groups each generation. To simplify analysis, we assumed a sim-268
ple genetic mechanism underlying instinctive behavior in collective actions while neglecting cultural effects (and transfer of269
experience between generations). Studying interactions between identity fusion, genetic relatedness, and cultural transmission270
of behaviors will be an important next step.271
Our eight experimental studies provide preliminary empirical evidence for our model, as do other previous studies on272
the causes and consequences of identity fusion.20,22, 65 Our empirical findings across study groups suggest a consistently273
robust trend for dysphoria’s role in extreme cooperation, beyond the effects of group performance or kinship on cooperation274
that have previously been documented. However, more experimental and longitudinal research is required to substantiate the275
causal claims made by the model. It is also necessary to develop experiments directly contrasting the hypotheses advanced276
here with alternative explanations. Furthermore, our studies have all relied on self-report measures. This is in part because the277
behavioral variables in which we are primarily interested – costly self-sacrificial behaviors – are difficult to measure directly.278
The use of more benign and commonplace behavioral measures (e.g., economic games) do not approximate our interests,279
and are therefore poor proxies. Nevertheless, measuring extreme sacrifice directly is impractical and unethical for obvious280
reasons. Instead we adopt a variety of plausible proxies for extreme sacrifice including identity fusion which has been shown281
repeatedly to motivate endorsement of extreme sacrifice (e.g. using trolley problems) as well as actual self-sacrifice in real-282
world correlational studies (e.g. among insurgent groups in Libya20). Further field-based experiments, in which we can set up283
realistic scenarios for costly sacrifice, are required. Finally, we have not tested all the predictions of the model. For example,284
an intuitive prediction of our model, which we have not directly tested here, is that identity fusion will be stronger in small285
groups than in large groups. This is consistent with the observation that soldiers are more willing to die for each other (their286
unit comrades) than for abstract group categories or values (e.g., God and country).66287
Our models are meant to capture conditions faced by our ancestors tens of thousands years ago. As such they are not288
directly applicable to modern groups which have much large sizes and experience different selection regimes. However our289
argument (which is standard in evolutionary psychology67) is that certain “social instincts” in humans that evolved under290
ancestral conditions can still be expressed under certain conditions (cf. with “spontaneous altruism” observed in experiments291
where subjects are forced to make decisions quickly68).292
Understanding the causes of self-sacrifice for a group is a high priority not only for the evolutionary and psychological293
sciences but also for society at large. The spirit of self-sacrifice for the group has been a driving force of many historical294
events.69,70 Many of the world’s ongoing violent conflicts are fuelled by extreme commitment to groups. Nevertheless,295
people show variation in the extent of fusion with their groups.15 This heterogeneity could be caused by differences in296
life history, cultural environment, or developmental factors. Certain groups have high levels of identity fusion, and certain297
events and/or experiences can cause higher identity fusion that can be exploited to mobilize extreme pro-group behaviors.298
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Understanding altruistic and cooperative behavior by individuals and groups is notoriously difficult as there are multiple299
forces and factors underlying it, including kinship, reciprocity, punishment, mutualism, and various cultural beliefs and biases.300
However if we are to address such pressing social issues as suicide terrorism, holy wars, gangland violence, and other forms301
of intergroup conflict, we should take into account psychological predispositions conditioning extreme cooperation on shared302
past experiences.303
Methods304
Numerical simulations. We treated individuals as sexual haploid. To implement selection, we used the two-level Fisher-Wright305
framework.40,42, 71 Specifically, group selection is captured by making each group in the new generation to independently306
descend from a group in the previous generation with probability proportional to S j. Individual selection within each group is307
implemented by first independently choosing 2n parents from the group members with probabilities proportional to payoffs fi j308
and then producing n offspring assuming free recombination. [Results with completely linked genes are qualitatively similar.]309
Offspring production was followed by random mutation and then by random dispersal of nG offspring among G groups.310
In numerical simulations we considered all possible combinations of the following parameters: benefit of collective action311
b = 0.5,1.0,2.0; cost of collective action c = 0.5,1.0,2.0; group size n = 4,8,12 (Ref.52,53); relative importance of previous312
experience h= 0.2,0.5,0.8, and the proportion of groups with dysphoric experience π = 0.2,0.5,0.8. Parameters that did not313
change are: number of groups G= 1000, mutation rate µ = 0.0001, and the standard deviation of mutational effects σ = 0.5.314
To simplify the comparison of the two games we set the half-saturation parameter Z0 = 1 and made the total contested benefit315
in “us vs. them” games equal to bG, so that that the expected benefit per group is b as in “us vs. nature” games. We ran316
simulations for 20,000 generations 10 times for each combination of parameters (see the SI for more details).317
Details of experiments. Individual study methodologies, including scale items, as well as individual study data analyses318
are detailed in the SI. Correlations were examined using Pearson’s r or Spearman’s ρ where appropriate. Correlations were di-319
rectly compared using Fisher’s or Steiger’s R-to-Z test where appropriate. To measure indirect effects, bias-corrected bootstrap320
analyses based on 5,000 bootstrap samples were run; these analyses are robust against violations of normality assumptions.321
All regression coefficients (b) reported are unstandardized, and all confidence internals (CI) are set at 95%.322
323
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(a) (b)
Figure 1. Shared dysphoric experiences. (a): Bruises and welts from Brazilian Jiu Jitsu belt whipping gauntlets (Photos: Chris Kavanagh). (b):
Memorial in Misrata to the thousands of revolutionaries in Libya who laid down their lives in the 2011 uprising (Photo: Harvey Whitehouse).
10/12
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure 2. Effects of the benefit b, cost c, group size n, and the weight of previous experience h on the average individual efforts in euphoric groups x and
dysphoric groups y. (a) and (b): “us vs. nature” contests with the frequency of euphoric groups π = 0.5. In these games, the value of π does not affect the
outcomes. (c) and (d): “us vs. them” contests with π = 0.2. (e) and (f): “us vs. them” contests with π = 0.8. The height of the bars is also reflected in their
color using the gray colormap (low values in black and high values in white; specific to each individual panel). Notice the difference in the y-scale between
subgraphs.
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1. Additional numerical and analytical results
In our models, individuals make contributions to the collective good not because they are “altru-
istic” but because this increases their fitness. Our “us vs. nature” games are similar the Volun-
teer’s dilemma games (1–3). Our “us vs. nature” games correspond to models of between-group
contests in economics theory (4).
(a) Additional numerical results. Figures (S1-S2) show our results for all values of π con-
sidered.
2
Figure S1: Effects of the benefit b, cost c, group size n, the weight of previous experience h, and the frequency of
euphoric groups π on the average individual efforts in euphoric groups x and dysphoric groups y in “us vs. nature”
games. The height of the bars is also reflected in their color using the gray colormap (low values in black and high
values in white; specific to each individual panel). Notice the difference in the y-scale between subgraphs.
3
Figure S2: Effects of the benefit b, cost c, group size n, the weight of previous experience h, and the frequency of
euphoric groups π on the average individual efforts in euphoric groups x and dysphoric groups y in “us vs. them”
games. The height of the bars is also reflected in their color using the gray colormap (low values in black and high
values in white; specific to each individual panel). Notice the difference in the y-scale between subgraphs.
4
(b) Analytical approximations. We used the invasion analysis and adaptive dynamics meth-
ods (5, 6). As any other approximate technique, this approach is based on certain assumptions
(5, 6). Therefore it is always important to check analytical approximations against numerical
simulations. In our case, the match between predictions and the numerical results reported
above is quite satisfactory.
Consider a mutant (u, v) in a resident population (x, y). The mutant can find itself in an eu-
phoric group (with probability π) or dysphoric group (with probability 1− π). The correspond-
ing total group efforts are Xu = u + (n − 1)x, Yv = v + (n − 1)y, respectively. The mutant’s
payoffs in an euphoric and dysphoric groups are fe = 1+bPe−cu and fd = 1+bPd−cv, where
Pe and Pd are the corresponding P values for an euphoric and a dysphoric group with a single
mutant. The average payoffs of such groups are fe = 1 + bPe − c Xun and fd = 1 + bPd − c Yvn .
The probabilities of survival of an euphoric and a dysphoric group are Se = h+ (1− h)Pe and
Sd = (1 − h)Pd. Then the invasion fitness of mutant (u, v) in a resident population (x, y) is
proportional to
w(u, v|x, y) = π Se fe
fe
+ (1− π) Sd fd
fd
For “us vs. nature” games, the shares of the reward going to a group with a mutant are
Pe =
Xu
Xu + Z0
, Pd =
Yv
Yv + Z0
,
respectively. For “us vs. them” games, these shares are
Pe =
Xu
Z
, Pd =
Yv
Z
,
where Z = πGX +(1−π)GY,X = nx, Y = ny. Dynamic equations for x and y are found by
computing appropriate selection gradients (5, 6). Below we present equations for the predicted
equilibrium values of x and y.
For “us vs. nature” games, the selection gradients Dx = ∂w(u,v|x,y)∂u |u=x,v=y and Dy =
5
∂w(u,v|x,y)
∂v |u=x,v=y are
Dx,nature = π
(1− h)[bp(1− p)− cx(n− p) + 1− p]− h(n− 1)c(x+ x0)
n(x+ x0)(1 + bp− cx) ,
Dy,nature = (1− π) (1− h)[bq(1− q)− cy(n− q) + 1− q]
n(y + x0)(1 + bq − cy) ,
where p = x/(x + x0), q = y/(y + x0) and x0 = Z0/n. The two independent equations
Dx,nature = 0, Dy,nature = 0 can be solved for an equilibrium numerically. Note that the
frequency of euphoric groups π affects only the rate of evolution but not the equilibrium values.
For “us vs. them” games, assuming the total benefit at stake is bG, the selection gradients
are
Dx,them = π
(1− h)[bx+ (1− ncx)z]− (n− 1)hcz2
nz[bx+ (1− cx)z] ,
Dy,them = (1− π) (1− h)[by + (1− ncy)z]
nz[by + (1− cy)z] ,
where z = πx+ (1− π)y is the average individual effort in the population. These two coupled
equations can be solved analytically for an equilibrium:
x∗ =
1 + b
nc
(1− h)[1− h− h(b+ 1− π)(1− 1n)]
[1− h− (1− 1n)hπb][1− h+ πh(1− 1n)]
,
y∗ =
1 + b
nc
1− h
1− h− hπb(1− 1n)
Under certain conditions, the predicted value of x∗ is negative which implies that x decreases
to zero. In this case, the equilibrium value of y can be found from equation [by+(1−ncy)z] = 0
with z = (1− π)y which results in
y∗∗ =
1 + b1−π
nc
. (1)
Note that increasing π makes y∗∗ larger.
(c) Genetic relatedness. To compare the effects of shared experience with those of genetic
relatedness we can use results in Ref.(7). Ref. (7) predicts that in the “us vs. nature” contests,
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the individual contribution z∗ evolves to be positive only if the benefit b is sufficiently large
(specifically, b > cZ0). In this case,
z∗ = z0
(√
b
cZ0
− 1
)
[1 + r(n− 1)],
where r is the average relatedness within the group and z0 = Z0/n (Ref.(7), section 2.1 and
Supplementary Material). In the “us vs. them” contests, z∗ evolves always to be non-negative
and equal to
z∗ =
1 + b
nc
[1 + r(n− 1)]
(Ref.(7), section 2.2 and Supplementary Material). Note that the term 1 + r(n− 1) commonly
appears in models of collective action allowing for genetic relatedness (e.g. (7, 8)). For exam-
ple, let b = 2, c = 1, n = 8. With only one sex dispersing as in chimpanzees and likely our
ancestors (9), r is predicted (10) to be 1/3(n−1) ≈ 0.05. [This number is close to empirical es-
timates r = 0.07 in (11) and r = 0.04 in (12).] Then the two equations above predict z∗ = 0.07
and z∗ = 0.50 in “us vs. nature ” and “us vs. them” games, respectively. The corresponding
numbers from Fig. 1 for dysphoric experience with h = π = 0.5, are 0.15 and 0.60, respec-
tively. That is, shared dysphoric experience can have effects significantly larger than genetic
relatedness.
(d) Variation in fusion. Between-individual variation in fusion can be mathematically cap-
tured by introducing variation in how individuals value the group success: a highly-fused indi-
vidual views the group’s success as his/her own success. Now we can use the results in Ref.(13)
on collective action in groups with heterogeneity in valuation. In that paper, group members
differed in their rank i so that fertility of individual i in group j was defined as
fij = 1 + bPjnvi − czij,
where vi was the share of the group reward going to the individual of rank i or his/her valuation
of the resources the groups compete for. If individuals share the reward equally, vi = 1/n.
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Ref.(13) showed that only individuals with valuations vi higher than a certain threshold will
make a non-zero effort, while low valuators will free ride, contributing nothing. Individual effort
increases with valuation; counter-intuitively however, the individual fertility can decreases with
valuation. Under conditions of strong between-group competition, high-rank group members
have very low, practically zero, that is, they will act in a self-sacrificial way (e.g. see Figures
4d and 5d in Ref.(13)). Interpreting these results in terms of our model, this means that highly
fused individuals (i.e., those with the highest valuation vi of the group’s success) will make the
highest effort and can have extremely low fitness.
The behaviour of the highest valuators may seem altruistic but, as explained in (13, 14),
actually it is not. Such individuals maximize their fitness by contributing; given the subordinates
do not contribute at all, dominants will not be better off by reducing their contribution. Thus,
the non-contributors are indeed free-riding, but the contributors are not altruistic; paradoxically,
they are acting in their own interest by contributing to the collective good. What is driving their
contribution is that they are essentially competing with their counterparts in other groups rather
than with their own group-mates.
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2. Details of experiments
The experiments were run either online or in person; in each case, ethical approval 
and informed consent were obtained prior to data collection. In reporting statistical 
analyses, we followed APA 6th ed. standard statistical abbreviations. E.g., N = sample 
size, M = mean, SD = standard deviation, SE = standard error of the mean, b = 
unstandardized regression coefficient, b* = standardized regression coefficient, 
95%CI = confidence interval at 95%, r = Pearson’s correlation coefficient,  = ϱ
Spearman’s correlation coefficient, α=Cronbach’s α, df = degrees of freedom, also 
noted in parentheses of test statistics, P = probability value indicating statistical 
significance. 
(a) Studies 1 and 2: Shared experiences
Methods
Participants
American citizens were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). 
Participants in Study 1 were paid US$1, and participants in Study 2 were paid 
US$0.75. There was no overlap in the subjects between Study 1 and Study 2. In Study
1 (N=195), 52.8% of participants were female, 46.2% male, and 1% other; age range 
was 21 to 71 years (M=37.74, SD=11.25). Demographic data was not obtained for 
Study 2 to reduce the length of the study; it is reasonable to assume similar 
demographic representation across both studies (Paolacci and Chandler 2014, 
Goodman et al. 2013)
Procedure: Study 1
After providing demographic information, participants were introduced to the notion 
of self-defining experiences. They were given four core characteristics of self-
defining experiences. Following Singer and Blagov (2002), a self-defining experience
is one that (a) helps explain who you are as an individual and might be an experience 
you would tell someone else about if you wanted that person to understand you in a 
profound way; (b) you can remember very clearly and that still feels important to you 
even as you think about it; (c) can be either positive or negative (or both) in how it 
makes you feel. The only important aspect is that it leads to strong feelings; (d) that 
you have thought about many times. Its memory should be familiar to you like a 
picture you have studied or a song (happy or sad) you have learned by heart.
Participants were then asked three questions about the extent to which they 
shared self-defining experiences with their fellow Americans:
1. To what extent are your self-defining experiences ones that you had as an 
American.
2. To what extent do you think your fellow Americans share similar self-defin-
ing experiences with you?
3. To what extent do you think your fellow Americans would feel the same way 
as you do, if they had similar self-defining experiences?
Participants responded to all three questions on a 7-point scale, anchored at 0 (Not at 
all) and 6 (Very Much). Then, participants answered two questions about “the 
experiences [they] have in [their] everyday life”, using the same 7-point scale:
1. To what extent do you think your fellow Americans share similar everyday 
experiences with you?
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2. To what extent do you think your fellow Americans would feel the same way 
as you do, if they had similar everyday experiences?
In the next section participants were either given a scenario in which the United States
had just suffered a major terrorist attack (N=98) or one in which the United States had
just suffered a major natural disaster (N=97). In either case, participants are told that 
“Dozens of people have already been killed, but many more are at risk. The cost of 
reducing the profound negative environmental impact of the disaster, repairing 
essential infrastructure, and providing food, shelter, and medical attention to victims 
is estimated at over US$150 million. If such help is not provided soon, the indirect 
death toll will increase, and the long term damage will be more serious.”
Participants were then told that:
“To help fellow Americans in the face of this disaster, a few efforts have begun:
1. Charities are asking for increased short- and long-term donations.
2. Volunteer organizations are recruiting short- and long-term volunteers to help 
in multiple areas (e.g., administrative, communications, medical assistance, 
physical labor).
3. Joint publicity campaigns have been launched to raise awareness, funds, and 
volunteers around the US.
4. Efforts are being made to enact a temporary tax increase to raise funds for the 
relief and repair effort.
5. Efforts are being made to propose measures to increase the nation's prepared-
ness for future incidents.”
On a scale from 0 (Not at all) to 100 (Definitely), participants rated how likely they 
were to:
1. Make a short term donation
2. Make a long term donation
3. Volunteer in the short term
4. Volunteer in the long term
5. Help spread awareness about opportunities to help
6. Support a temporary tax increase
7. Support measures to prevent future incidents
Procedure: Study 2
Participants answered the same questions about self-defining and everyday memories 
as in Study 1. Then, they completed a verbal fusion scale (Gómez, Brooks, 
Buhrmester, Vazquez, Jetten, & Swann, 2011), on a 6-point scale (Strongly Disagree, 
Disagree, Disagree Somewhat, Agree Somewhat, Agree, Strongly Agree):
1. I am one with America.
2. I feel immersed in America.
3. I have a deep emotional bond with America.
4. America is me.
5. I'll do for America more than any of the other residents would do.
6. I am strong because of America.
7. I make America strong.
Finally, participants were asked about the extent to which they endorsed a 
series of extreme pro-group behaviours (Gómez et al., 2011), on the same 6-point 
scale:
1. I would do anything to protect America.
2. I would sacrifice my life if it saved another American's life.
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3. I would sacrifice my life if it gave America status.
4. I would fight someone physically threatening another American.
5. I would fight someone insulting or making fun of America as a whole.
6. I would help others get revenge on someone who insulted America.
7. Hurting other people is acceptable if it means protecting America.
Results: Study 1
Descriptive statistics for shared self-defining experiences, shared everyday 
experiences, and cooperation are as follows:
Table 1.
Descriptive statistics for shared self-defining experiences, shared everyday 
experiences, and cooperation
Variable Skew (SE) Kurt. (SE) α M (SD)
Self-defining experiences -.242 (.174) -.225 (.346) .707 4.605 (1.239)
Everyday experiences -.248 (.174) -.471 (.346) .780 5.069 (1.196)
Cooperation -.311 (.174) -.442 (.346) .831 57.108 (21.265)
Cooperation (Natural) -.345 (.245) -.065 (.485) .770 52.383 (19.032)
Cooperation (Terrorist) -.467 (.244) -.573 (.483) .869 60.895 (22.733)
To test Hypothesis 1, we examined Pearson’s correlations between shared experiences
and cooperation, as reported in the main text. 
We also ran a multiple linear regression, with condition (Natural v. Terrorist), self-
defining experiences, everyday experiences, and the interaction between condition 
and each type of shared experience as independent variables, and cooperation as the 
dependent variable. This allows us to test Hypothesis 4, and to examine the relative 
contributions of self-defining versus everyday experiences. We found a main effect of 
condition, b = 6.615 (SE = 2.938), 95%CI[.821, 12.410], such that willingness to 
cooperate was higher for the terrorist attack than for the natural disaster. In the main 
text, we also report a Student’s t-test, showing the same effect. Furthermore, we found
that with both self-defining and everyday experiences in the same model, there was 
only a significant effect of self-defining experiences, b = 4.144 (SE = 1.858), 
95%CI[.478, 7.810]. The effect of shared everyday experiences was no longer 
statistically significant, b = -.324 (SE = 1.894), 95%CI[-4.061, 3.412]. There were no 
significant interactions between condition and shared experiences. 
 
Results: Study 2
Descriptive and inferential statistics for shared self-defining experiences, shared 
everyday experiences, identity fusion, and endorsement of extreme behaviors are as 
follows:
Table 2.
Descriptive statistics for shared self-defining experiences, shared everyday 
experiences, identity fusion, and endorsement of extreme behaviors
Variable Skew (SE) Kurt. (SE) α M (SD)
Self-defining experiences -.422 (.195) .185 (.387) .766 4.718 (1.282)
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Everyday experiences -.587 (.195) .718 (.387) .777 5.003 (1.131)
Identity fusion -.262 (.195) -.016 (.387) .936 3.763 (1.089)
Endorsement of ext. beh. .736 (.195) .322 (.387) .912 3.087 (1.355)
Table 3.
Pearson’s correlation matrix for shared self-defining experiences, shared everyday 
experiences, identity fusion, and endorsement of extreme behaviors 
Self-defining 
experiences
Everyday 
experiences
Identity 
fusion
Endorsement of 
ext. beh.
Self-defining 
experiences
- .478** .654** .545**
Everyday 
experiences
.478** - .486** .279**
Identity fusion .654** .486** - .688**
Endorsement of 
ext. beh.
.545** .279** .688** -
** P < .001
As distributions for self-defining experiences, everyday experiences, and endorsement
of extreme behaviors were mildly skewed, nonparametric correlations are also 
reported here:
Table 4.
Spearman’s correlation matrix for shared self-defining experiences, shared everyday 
experiences, identity fusion, and endorsement of extreme behaviors 
Self-defining 
experiences
Everyday 
experiences
Identity 
fusion
Endorsement of 
ext. beh.
Self-defining 
experiences
- .421** .606** .528**
Everyday 
experiences
.421** - .478** .235**
Identity fusion .606** .479** - .683**
Endorsement of 
ext. beh.
.528** .235** .683** -
** P < .001
To further investigate the psychological mechanisms mediating the effect of shared 
experiences on progroup behavior, we conducted simple mediation analyses using 
ordinary least squares path analysis in Hayes’s PROCESS macro (Model 4) for SPSS 
(Hayes, 2013). Bias-corrected bootstrap analyses based on 5,000 bootstrap samples 
were run; such analyses are very robust against violations of normality 
assumptions. Separate analyses were run for self-defining and everyday experiences. 
Fusion was entered as a potential mediator between self-defining experiences and 
endorsement of extreme behaviours (Table 5) and everyday experiences and 
endorsement of extreme behaviours (Table 6). The confidence intervals for the 
indirect effects were entirely above zero for both self-defining experiences and 
everyday experiences. There was also a direct effect of self-defining experiences on 
endorsement of extreme behaviors independent on its effect on identity fusion. For 
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everyday experiences there was no significant direct effect detected, the effect was 
fully mediated by fusion.
Table 5.
Total, direct, and indirect effects for self-defining experiences
Effect SE 95% CI
Total effect .5764 .0735 .4313, .7216
Direct effect .1757 .0800 .0176, .3338
Unstandardized indirect effect .4007 .0655 .2842, .5377
Standardized indirect effect .3791 .0533 .2835, .4952
Table 6.
Total, direct, and indirect effects for everyday experiences
Effect SE 95% CI
Total effect .3343 .0985 .1396, .5289
Direct effect -.0867 .0694 -.2238, .0504
Unstandardized indirect effect .4210 .0733 .2925, .5838
Standardized indirect effect .3515 .0489 .2556, .4490
As in Study 1, we also examined the effects of shared self-defining and everyday 
experiences in the same model. First, we regressed self-defining and everyday 
experiences on identity fusion, and found that both independent variables predicted 
the dependent variable. The effect of self-defining experiences was b = .465 (SE = .
057), 95%CI[.351, .578]; the effect of everyday experiences was b = .216 (SE = .065),
95%CI[.088, .344]. Then, we regressed self-defining and everyday experiences on 
endorsement of extreme behaviours, and found only a significant effect of self-
defining experiences, b = .579 (SE = .083), 95%CI[.416, .743]    
(b) Study 3: Shared Dysphoria v. Euphoria
Methods
Participants and Procedures
We used longitudinal data (statto.com, 2014) to estimate dysphoria over time for the 
UK’s top football league (the Premier League), considering percentage of home and 
away games won, drawn and lost, as well as relegations and total league points. Of 35
teams who had been in the Premier League over the last ten years, we selected teams 
that were currently in the Premier League (to control current media exposure) and that
had played at least one previous season in this league. We then focused on the five 
most consistently successful/euphoria-producing teams (Manchester United, Chelsea, 
Arsenal, Liverpool and Manchester City) and the five most consistently 
unsuccessful/dysphoria-producing teams (West Bromwich Albion, Norwich, 
Sunderland, Hull, and Crystal Palace). An online questionnaire (N=752) was 
advertised to a diverse cross-section of football fans through social media, online fan 
forum groups, dedicated fan blogs and across student networks. This methodology 
reflects the diversity of our target sample population, as teams from across England 
were included. Recent episodes of dysphoria / euphoria were controlled as the study 
was released for a brief period mid-season and before any significant or decisive 
matches had taken place. In analyses below, we coded participants who affiliated with
one of the five most consistently unsuccessful/dysphoria producing teams vs. one of 
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the five most successful/euphoria producing teams as a dichotomous variable 
(euphoria vs. dysphoria club affiliation). 
Participants of all teams were given the opportunity to participate to prevent the 
research purpose being revealed but the relevant teams’ fan groups were 
predominantly contacted to advertise the study. Twenty-seven participants selected a 
team other than the 10 focal teams of analysis, and we dropped their responses from 
the dataset, leaving N=725. There was a variation in response rates and we were 
concerned that our results may have been unduly influenced by the large number of 
Sunderland fans in the sample (N=290). We therefore re-ran all analyses excluding 
Sunderland participants and the pattern of results remained consistent. The results we 
present below include Sunderland fans. Variation in response rates was largely due to 
the support of a few popular bloggers who were enthusiastic about our research and 
advertised it to fellow fans following their sites. A £100 prize was offered to all 
participants as an incentive to complete the study.
Of the 725 participants (Mage = 39.5, SD = 15.77), 88.9% were male (11.1% female), 
100% had completed secondary level education, and 54.07% had university 
education. There were null or weak zero-order relationships between educational 
background, age, gender and outcome variables.
Measures
Identity fusion was assessed using the 7-point verbal scale (M=4.28, SD=1.23, α=.89)
(Gómez et al., 2011) in reference to fellow club fans.
Endorsement of self-sacrificial pro-group behaviour was measured with a modified 
version of an intergroup trolley dilemma (Swann, Gómez, Huici, Morales, & Hizon, 
2010) in which participants contemplated sacrificing their lives to save the lives of 
five fellow club members imperilled on trolley tracks. Participants responded to the 
question “To what extent would you be willing to sacrifice your life to save the 
others?” on a 7-point Likert scale (not at all willing to extremely willing).
Moralizing of group-related actions was measured with 4 items on 7-point Likert 
scales (α=.86) as follows: 
1. I am obligated to always do right by my club. 
2. I feel a sense of duty to my club. 
3. If I took advantage of my club, I’d feel immense shame. 
4. If I deceived my club in some ways, I would consider myself to be a bad 
person. 
Results
Table 7.
Descriptive statistics for eu- vs dys-phoria, self-sacrifice, moralizing group actions, 
and identity fusion
Variable Skew (SE) Kurt. (SE) α M (SD)
Eu- vs. dys-phoria category -1.142 (.091) -.697 (.181) -- .75 (.435)
Self-sacrifice endorsement .809 (.091) -.629 (.181) -- 2.640 (1.895)
Moralize group-related 
actions
-.438 (.091) -.022 (.181) .863 4.705 (1.298)
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Identity fusion -.283 (.091) -.171 (.181) .936 4.308 (1.224)
Table 8.
Pearson’s r correlation matrix for eu- vs dys-phoria, self-sacrifice, moralizing group 
actions, and identity fusion
Eu- vs. dys-phoria 
category
Self-sacrificial 
endorsement
Moralize group-
related actions
Eu- vs dys-phoric 
category
-
Self-sacrificial 
endorsement
.120** -
Moralize group-
related actions
.109* .252** -
Identity fusion .177** .174** .565**
*P < .01,  ** P < .001
Table 9.
Spearman’s correlation matrix for eu- vs dys-phoria, self-sacrifice, moralizing group 
actions, and identity fusion
Eu- vs. dys-phoric 
category
Self-sacrificial 
endorsement
Moralize group-
related actions
Eu- vs dys-phoric 
category
-
Self-sacrificial 
endorsement
.101* -
Moralize group-
related actions
.099* .240** -
Identity fusion .155** .165** .541**
*P < .01,  ** P < .001
To test Hypothesis 2, we compared members of dysphoric and euphoric groups by 
conducting two t-tests. In line with Hypothesis 2, we found that compared to euphoric
groups, dysphoric groups more strongly endorsed self-sacrifice in the trolley dilemma,
Mdys = 2.77, SDdys = 1.96, vs. Meup = 2.25, SDeup = 1.62, t (723 ) = 3.24, p = .001, and 
moralizing group-related actions Mdys = 4.79, SDdys = 1.26, vs. Meup = 4.46, SDeup  = 
1.37, t (723) = 2.95, p = .003. 
To further investigate the psychological mechanism that mediates the effect of shared 
dysphoria on progroup behavior, we conducted the same simple mediation analyses in
Study 2, using Hayes’s (2013) PROCESS macro (Model 4) for SPSS. In the model, 
the response to the trolley dilemma (i.e., self-sacrifice endorsement) was the outcome,
fusion the mediator, and euphoria vs dysphoria club affiliation the predictor. As seen 
in the Table below, the confidence intervals for the indirect effect, direct effect, and 
total effect were all above zero. 
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Table 10.
Total, direct, and indirect effects for self-sacrifice endorsement
Effect SE 95% CI
Total effect .5217 .1603 .2058, .8376
Direct effect .4001 .1616 .0828, .7174
Unstandardized indirect effect .1216 .0405 .0545, .2203
Standardized indirect effect .0279 .0090 .0135, .0500
The same analysis was conducted but with the moralize group-related actions variable
as the outcome instead. 
Table 11.
Total, direct, and indirect effects moralizing group-related actions
Effect SE 95% CI
Total effect .3252 .1104 .1084, .5419
Direct effect .0275 .0932 -.1554, .2104
Unstandardized indirect effect .2976 .0687 .1632, .4336
Standardized indirect effect .0997 .0225 .0545, .1430
Since relatively few participants were female in the sample, we also conducted the 
main analyses above without females in the dataset (N = 645). Consistent with the 
above, analyses revealed that compared to euphoric groups, dysphoric groups more 
strongly endorsed self-sacrifice in the trolley dilemma, Mdys = 2.79, SDdys = 1.99, vs. 
Meup = 2.21, SDeup = 1.63, t (643) = 2.73, p = .006, and moralizing group-related ac-
tions Mdys = 4.79, SDdys = 1.27, vs. Meup = 4.46, SDeup  = 1.37, t (643) = 3.32, p = .001. 
Furthermore, the mediation effects were also replicated in the all male subsample. Fu-
sion still mediated the effect on self-sacrifice endorsement, the unstandardized indi-
rect effect b = .1132 (SE = .0405), 95%CI = [.0497, .2127] and on moralizing group-
related actions b = .2827 (SE = .0711), 95%CI = [.1512, .4298]. 
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(c) Studies 4 to 6: Dysphoric intensity 
Study 4
Methods
Participants
The sample consisted of 380 participants (100% male; Mage=64.00 years, 89% 
Caucasian) recruited online via advertisements on the website Facebook. Facebook 
users could click on an ad with the title "Vietnam Veterans Survey" and be taken to 
the survey description and informed consent page. All participants indicated at the 
beginning of the survey that they had served in combat in the Vietnam War as part of 
the U.S. military. 
Procedures
After completing informed consent, participants completed the following scales in 
this order: 
Fusion with fellow Vietnam veterans was measured using the 7-point Likert verbal 
fusion scale, which was used in Study 2, and adapted for the present target group 
(Gómez et al., 2011). 
Six items measured the extent participants experienced the injury and loss of close 
others due to combat in Vietnam. Responses were yes (1) or no (0), and summed to 
produce a total score of shared dysphoric intensity. 
1. Did you experience the injury of friends known before the war? 
2. Did you experience the loss of friends known before the war? 
3. Did you experience the injury of family members? 
4. Did you experience the loss of family members? 
5. Did you experience the injury of comrades in combat with you?
6. Did you experience the loss of comrades in combat with you?
Three items measured willingness to support veterans in need on 7-point Likert 
scales: 
1. How willing would you be to visit with veterans in need?
2. How willing would you be to volunteer to provide help to veterans in need?
3. How willing would you be to provide support to veterans in need?
Last, participants completed demographic information and were debriefed. 
Results
Descriptive and inferential statistics for identity fusion, combat experiences, and 
willingness to support veterans are as follows:
Table 12.
Descriptive statistics for identity fusion, combat experiences, and willingness to 
support veterans
Variable Skew (SE) Kurt. (SE) α M (SD)
Identity fusion -.848 (.125) .091 (.250) .916 5.179 (1.543)
Combat experiences -.351 (.125) -.419 (.250) .578 3.269 (1.446)
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Willingness to support -.664 (.125) -.582 (.250) .953 5.085 (1.769)
To test Hypotheses 3, we conducted Pearson’s correlations on the extent of combat 
experiences, identify fusion, and willingness to support veterans. Spearman’s 
correlations are also reported below, in Table 14.
Table 13.
Pearson’s correlation matrix for identity fusion, combat experiences, and willingness 
to support veterans
Identity fusion Combat experiences
Identity fusion -
Combat experiences .203** -
Willingness to support .435** .184**
** P < .001
Table 14.
Spearman’s correlation matrix for identity fusion, combat experiences, and 
willingness to support veterans
Identity fusion Combat experiences
Identity fusion -
Combat experiences .211** -
Willingness to support. .422** .168**
** P < .001
Similar to Study 2 and 3, simple mediation analyses were conducted using Hayes’s 
PROCESS macro (Model 4) for SPSS. In the model, the sum of combat experiences 
was the predictor, fusion the mediator, and willingness to support veterans the 
outcome. As seen in Table 15 below, the confidence intervals for the indirect effect, 
direct effect, and total effect were all above zero. 
Table 15.
Total, direct, and indirect effects
Effect SE 95% CI
Total effect .2357 .0618 .1141, .3572
Direct effect .1330 .0576 .0198, .2463
Unstandardized indirect effect .1026 .0290 .0521, .1668
Standardized indirect effect .0839 .0231 .0431, .1365
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Study 5
Methods
Participants
146 past and present U.S. college sorority and fraternity members (52.7% female, 
47.3% male; Mage=32.45, SD=9.242; Age range=18 to 67 years) were recruited using 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), and were paid US$1. 
Procedure
Participants completed the 7-item Centrality of Event Scale (Berntsen & Rubin, 
2006), on a 5-point scale anchored at 1 (Totally Disagree) and 5 (Totally Agree):
1. I feel that this event has become part of my identity.
2. This event has become a reference point for the way I understand myself and 
the world
3. I feel that this event has become a central part of my life story.
4. This event has colored the way I think and feel about other experiences.
5. This event permanently changed my life.
6. I often think about the effects this event will have on my future.
7. This event was a turning point in my life.
They then completed the verbal fusion scale (Gomez et al., 2011; see also Study 1) on
a 7-point scale (Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Disagree Somewhat, Neither Agree nor 
Disagree, Agree Somewhat, Agree, Strongly Agree), with their fraternity/sorority as 
the target group, followed by the pro-group sacrifice measure, which they responded 
to using the same 7-point scale:
1. I would give up a lot of my time for my [fraternity/sorority] (e.g., to volunteer 
at events, help with recruiting).
2. I would donate a significant sum of money to my [fraternity/sorority] if it 
needed it.
3. I would publicly advocate for my [fraternity/sorority] against its critics.
4. I would fight someone physically threatening another member of my [frater-
nity/sorority].
5. I would fight someone insulting or making fun of my [fraternity/sorority].
6. I would help others get revenge on someone who insulted a member of my 
[fraternity/sorority].
7. Hurting other people is acceptable if it means protecting my [fraternity/soror-
ity].
Results
Descriptive and inferential statistics for centrality of event, identity fusion, and pro-
group sacrifice are as follows:
Table 16.
Descriptive statistics for centrality of event, identity fusion, and pro-group sacrifice
Variable Skew (SE) Kurt. (SE) α M (SD)
Centrality of event .167 (.201) -.800 (.399) .935 2.492 (1.030)
Identity fusion -.446 (.201) -.753 (.399) .960 3.938 (1.599)
Pro-group sacrifice -.109 (.201) -.691 (.399) .898 3.389 (1.354)
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As a further test of Hypothesis 3, we examined the correlations among the perceived 
centrality of shared dysphoric events, identity fusion, and progroup sacrifice. The 
Pearson’s correlations are displayed in Table 17, while nonparametric correlations are 
displayed in Table 18.
Table 17.
Pearson’s correlation matrix for centrality of event, identity fusion, and pro-group 
sacrifice
Centrality of event Identity fusion Pro-group sacrifice
Centrality of event - .430** .429**
Identity fusion .430** - .796**
Pro-group sacrifice .429** .796** -
** P < .001
As identity fusion scores were mildly skewed and centrality of event scores were 
mildly kurtotic, nonparametric correlations are also reported here:
Table 18.
Spearman’s correlation matrix for centrality of event, identity fusion, and pro-group 
sacrifice
Centrality of event Identity fusion Pro-group sacrifice
Centrality of event - .424** .450**
Identity fusion .424** - .740**
Pro-group sacrifice .450** .740** -
** P < .001
A simple mediation analysis was also run as in Study 2, 3, and 4 above. The 
confidence intervals for the indirect effect was entirely above zero, and there was no 
evidence for a direct effect of centrality of event on pro-group sacrifice independent 
on its effect on identity fusion.
Table 19.
Total, direct, and indirect effects
Effect SE 95% CI
Total effect .5633 .0989 .3678, .7589
Direct effect .1387 .0727 -.0051, .2825
Unstandardized indirect effect .4246 .0839 .2704, .6004
Standardized indirect effect .3231 .0590 .2047, .4375
Study 6
Brazilian Jiu Jitsu (BJJ) is a grappling based combat sport and martial arts system that
developed in Brazil as an offshoot from Judo. Progression through the system is 
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structured through a graded belt system and although belt promotion practices vary 
between schools, there is a widespread and controversial dysphoric practice, known as
the belt-whipping gauntlet. These gauntlets involve the promoted student walking 
along a corridor formed by their training partners whilst being whipped repeatedly by 
their teammates’ using untied belts. The gauntlets tend to last only a few minutes but 
often result in severe bruising and welts for the recipients (see the image below). 
Crucially, for the current study there is variance in both the presence and intensity of 
this event between schools and it therefore provides a unique opportunity to test the 
hypotheses that: 1) dysphoric events with higher intensities result in higher levels of 
identity fusion and 2) that this predicts a greater willingness to engage in or endorse 
costly pro-group practices.
Methods
Participants
5631 BJJ practitioners were initially recruited for a survey hosted on a dedicated 
website (www.bjjsurveys.com) through advertisements placed on popular English 
language BJJ blogs, forums and podcasts. From this sample, 295 participants had 
experience of belt whipping promotions. In the sample, 95.6% (N=538) of 
respondents were males and 4.4% females (N=25) (Mage=31.23, SD=7.070) and North 
Americans accounted for 60.2%, Western Europeans for 15% and the remaining 
24.8% were widely dispersed. As sections of the survey were optional sample sizes 
are reported. The participants were not compensated for participating but had the 
option to enter a draw to win training equipment and a £20 prize.
Procedure
An online survey was constructed using Qualtrics software and hosted online. This 
study was a part of a larger survey on BJJ practitioners, which took 25 minutes to 
complete in total. After a section on the respondents’ history in BJJ, participants were 
asked:
How intense would you consider your belt promotion/grading experiences 
with your current, or most recent, BJJ school? 
Participants responded using a 6-point scale, anchored at 1 (Not Intense at all) and 6 
(Extremely Intense). They were then presented with the 7-item verbal fusion scale 
adapted for the BJJ school (Gómez et a., 2011; see Study 1), to which they responded 
on a 6-point scale anchored at 1 (Strongly Disagree) and to 6 (Strongly Agree). 
Following this, three measures of willingness to sacrifice for the respondent’s BJJ 
school were taken. The first, rated on a 6-point scale anchored at 1 (Strongly 
Disagree) and 6 (Strongly Agree), measured respondents’ willingness to give up time 
for their BJJ school: 
If my BJJ school really needed me I would be willing to donate my free time to
it. 
The second, rated on the same scale, measured respondents’ willingness to risk their 
lives for their BJJ school: 
If my BJJ school were threatened, I would be willing to risk my life fighting to 
defend it. 
1 This  total  excludes  42  responses  which  did  not  complete  the  relevant  identity  fusion
measures. None of the results reported were altered when these respondents were included in
analysis.
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These two items, taken from Silver and Brewer (1997) were embedded alongside 
seven other questions (Yuki, 2003) about the respondent’s BJJ school to reduce the 
potential for demand characteristics. The third and final item occurred in the context 
of a prize draw. Respondents were offered the chance to participate in a prize draw to 
win some training equipment and a monetary prize of £20. They were informed that 
five winners would be selected at random and were given the opportunity to donate 
some, or all, of the prize to their BJJ club anonymously. Using this voluntary donation
we obtained information about participants’ willingness to sacrifice monetary 
resources for their BJJ school. Participation in the draw was optional, as it required 
respondents to provide contact details.
Results
Descriptive statistics for promotion intensity, identity fusion, and outcome measures 
are as follows:
Table 20.
Descriptive statistics for promotion intensity, identity fusion, willingness to donate 
time, willingness to risk life and amount of bonus donated to BJJ school
Variable Skew (SE) Kurt. (SE) α M (SD)
Intensity of Promotion
Identity Fusion
.227 (.105)
-.144 (.103)
-1.273 (.210)
-.341 (.206)
-
.885
3.01 (1.680)
3.85 (1.066)
Donate Time
Risk Life
Donate Bonus
-1.219 (.103)
.711 (.103)
.744 (.128)
-2.011 (.209)
-.677 (.206)
-1.26 (.251)
-
-
-
5.06 (1.003)
2.57 (1.598)
-6.92 (17.530)
First, an independent t-test was conducted to assess whether the emotional intensity of
grading experiences was higher for individuals who experienced belt whippings 
during their promotion events. As expected, individuals from schools with belt-
whipping gauntlets reported higher level of intensity (M=3.32, SD=1.552) in 
promotion events than those from schools without the practice (M=2.68, SD=1.749), 
Welch’s t (535)=-4.395, 95% CI [-.920, -.361], P<.001. 
Second, we examined the overall correlation between intensity and identity fusion, 
using Spearman’s ρ due to non-normal distributions, and found a positive correlation 
(N=537, ρ =.134, P=.002).
Third, we examined the correlations between fusion and the self-reported measures of
willingness to donate time (N=561, ρ =.515, P<.001), and willingness to risk life 
(N=559, ρ =.546, P<.001), as well as the bonus donation measure (N=377, ρ =.250, 
P<.001). Inter-measure correlations are as follows:
Table 21.
Spearman’s correlation matrix for intensity of promotion, identity fusion, willingness 
to donate time, willingness to risk life and amount of bonus donated
Intensity Identity 
Fusion
Donate Time Risk Life Donate 
Bonus
Intensity - .134** .094* .173** .082
Identity Fusion .134** - .515** .546** .250**
Donate Time .094* .515** - .395** .282**
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Risk Life
Donate Bonus
.173*
.082
.546**
.250**
.395**
.282**
-
.181**
.181**
-
* P < .05 ** P < .001
This presents a third positive test of Hypothesis 3, as the intensity of shared dysphoric
experiences is significantly correlated with identity fusion, and two of our three 
outcome variables. 
Simple mediation analyses were run, as in Studies 2 through 5 above, to explore 
whether fusion mediated the effect of intensity on the three outcome measures. Bias-
corrected bootstrap analyses based on 5,000 bootstrap samples were run; such 
analyses are very robust against violations of normality assumptions. For willingness 
to donate time, the confidence intervals for the indirect effect were entirely above 
zero, and there was no evidence of a direct effect of intensity of promotion 
independent of its effect on identity fusion. Hence, the relationship between intensity 
and willingness to donate time was fully mediated by fusion. For willingness to risk 
life, the confidence intervals for the indirect effect were entirely above zero; there was
also a direct effect of intensity of ritual. However, the indirect effect on the bonus 
donation measure was only marginally significant.  
Table 22.
Total, direct, and indirect effects on willingness to donate time
Effect SE 95% CI
Total effect .0643 .0257 .0138, .1147
Direct effect .0226 .0228 -.0222, .0675
Unstandardized indirect effect .0416 .0120 .0181, .0679
Standardized indirect effect .0699 .0211 .0310, .1136
N=535
Table 23.
Total, direct, and indirect effects on willingness to risk life
Effect SE 95% CI
Total effect .1744 .0405 .0949, .2539
Direct effect .0994 .0344 .0318, .1670
Unstandardized indirect effect .0749 .0226 .0305, .1200
Standardized indirect effect .0790 .0236 .0320, .1246
N=533
Table 24.
Total, direct, and indirect effects on bonus donation measure 
Effect SE 95% CI
Total effect .9021 .5500 -.1796, 1.9837
Direct effect .6290 .5363 -.4257, 1.6837
Unstandardized indirect effect .2731 .1480 .0160, .6117
Standardized indirect effect .0260 .0141 .0018, .0586
N=365
Since relatively few participants were female in the sample, we also conducted the 
main analyses above excluding the 25 females in the dataset (N = 538). Consistent 
with the above, analyses demonstrated that individuals who had experienced dyspho-
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ric belt whippings rated their promotion experiences as more intense, M= 3.35, SD = 
1.55, vs. M= 2.71, SD = 1.76, t (511) = -4.410, p < .001. Furthermore, the mediation 
effects were also replicated in the all male subsample. Fusion still mediated the effect 
on willingness to donate time, the unstandardized indirect effect b = .0398 (SE = .
0129), 95%CI = [.0160, .0660], willingness to risk life b = .0728 (SE = .0236), 95%CI
= [.0280, .1219] and voluntary donation b = .2736 (SE = .1534), 95%CI = [.0022, .
6134]. 
(d) Studies 7 and 8: Shared experience and genetic relatedness
 
Study 7
Methods
Participants 
198 Americans (115 males, 83 females; Mage=47.15; SD=9.99) were recruited via 
AMT, and were paid US$0.50 for completing the study.
Procedure
Participants were first asked to write a paragraph on a topic to which they were 
randomly allocated. There were three different conditions: In the Experience 
condition (N=64) they were asked to “Write about an experience that has shaped the 
person you are today”, in the Gene condition (N=67) they were asked to “Write about
the kinds of traits that are genetically transmitted”, and in a Control condition (N=63)
they were asked to “Write about the changing seasons”. Participants in the Experience
condition were then asked to imagine meeting a person whom they did not know 
before, but who also had the very same experience. Participants in the Gene condition 
were asked to imagine meeting a brother/sister that they did not know they had and 
who they had never met before. Participants in the Control condition were just asked 
to imagine meeting a person they had never met before. For female participants the 
person was named Jane and for male participants the person was named John, such 
that participants were asked to think about gender matched characters. 
All participants were then asked to indicate what they thought their relationship might
be like with Jane/John. Specifically, we employed a continuous measure of identity 
fusion (Jiménez et al., 2015). Participants were asked to “Please indicate your 
relationship by clicking and dragging the smaller “me” circle to the position that best
captures how you would relate to Jane/John”. This measure provides an indicator of 
fusion: overlap of the two circles with a value between 0 and 100, with a value of 1 
when the circles just begin to overlap and 100 when they are completely overlapping. 
To measure willingness to make economic sacrifices, participants were then asked to 
consider the following scenario:
You find out that Jane/John needs an urgent and life-saving operation that will 
cost a large sum of money. What would you be most likely to do? 
Participants responded to this scenario by indicating how likely they would be to help 
Jane/John on scale ranging from 1(I would be most likely to do nothing) to 10 (I 
would be most likely to do whatever it takes, even selling everything I own). 
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Next participants were asked to consider a different scenario, to measure the extent to 
which they trusted Jane/John:
Imagine for a moment that you had done something that could potentially ruin 
your reputation and your life. For example, you may have cheated on your 
partner, stolen a significant amount of money, or lied about your qualifications
to get your job. You have decided that for your own mental health you need to 
tell someone about this, but the only people you would ordinarily have turned 
to for advice are unavailable. How likely would you be to tell Jane/John.
Participants responded to this scenario by indicating how likely they would be to tell 
Jane/John on a scale ranging from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely). 
Finally, in order to determine whether participants were paying sufficient attention to 
the survey we included a final item, which simply asked participants to move a slider 
from where it was sitting (0) all the way to the right (100). 
Results
Analysis of the attention-screening variable revealed that four participants did not 
move the slider all the way to the right (i.e., they had a response value of less than 
100). They were excluded from further analysis leaving a total of N=194 participants. 
As a test of Hypothesis 5, we compared the effects of fusion of the priming 
condition—shared experience, shared genes, and control—by running an ANOVA 
with condition predicting identity fusion. The ANOVA was significant, 
F(2,191)=36.55, P<.001, η2=.28. Fischer’s Least Square Differences post-hoc 
comparison revealed higher levels of fusion in the experience condition (M=32.17, 
SD=27.21) than in the gene condition (M=13.66, SD=17.31) and in the control 
condition (M=3.73, SD=6.84) (all P<.001). Levels of fusion in the gene condition 
were also significantly higher than in the control condition (P=.003).
To examine whether condition had an effect on our measure of economic-
sacrifice we ran the same ANOVA. This revealed a significant effect, F(2,191)=14.52,
P<.001, η2=.13. Post-hoc comparison showed that participants in the gene condition 
were more likely to make economic sacrifices for Jane/John (M=4.82, SD=2.19) than 
in the experience condition (M=4.09, SD=2.11), P=.045, and in the control condition 
(M=2.89, SD=1.84), P<.001. Likelihood of economic-sacrifice was also higher in the 
experience condition than in the control condition, P=.001. 
The same ANOVA revealed that condition had a significant effect on levels of 
trust, F(2,191)=8.19, P<.001, η2=.08. Post-hoc comparison revealed participants in 
the experience condition (M=3.19, SD=1.73) and in the gene condition (M=2.79, 
SD=1.75) were more likely to trust Jane/John than in the control condition (M=2.02, 
SD=1.49), P=.008. There was no significant difference in trust between the experience
and gene conditions, P=.173.
Table 25.
Pearson’s correlation matrix for identity fusion, economic sacrifice, trust 
Identity fusion Economic sacrifice Trust
Identity fusion - .402** .521**
Economic sacrifice .402** - .514**
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Trust .521** .514** -
** P < .001
Mediation Analyses
To examine whether identity fusion with Jane/John explained the effect of 
condition on economic-sacrifice and trust, we conducted mediation analyses. In 
particular, we focused on the effect of each experimental condition (experience, gene) 
compared to the control condition in separate analyses (coded: experimental 
condition=1 and control condition=0). Simple mediation analyses were conducted 
using ordinary least squares path analysis in Hayes’s PROCESS macro (Model 4) for 
SPSS (Hayes, 2013). Bias-corrected bootstrap analyses based on 5,000 bootstrap 
samples were run; such analyses are very robust against violations of normality 
assumptions. 
Focusing first on economic-sacrifice, we examined whether fusion mediated 
the effect of experience vs. control. As seen in Table 26 below, the confidence 
intervals for the indirect effect was entirely above zero for the effect of condition 
(experience vs. control) on economic sacrifice. There was no direct effect of condition
(experience vs. control). 
Table 26.
Total, direct, and indirect effects for condition (experience v. control) on economic 
sacrifice
Effect SE 95% CI
Total effect 1.2049 .3520 .5082, 1.9015
Direct effect 0.0848 .4000 -.7069, .8765
Unstandardized indirect effect 1.1201 .2763 .5976, 1.6696
Standardized indirect effect 0.2722 .0618 .1492, .3914
We next examined whether fusion mediated the effect of gene vs. control on 
economic sacrifice. As seen in Table 27 below, the confidence intervals for the 
indirect effect was entirely above zero for the effect of condition (gene vs. control) on 
economic sacrifice. There was also a direct effect of condition (gene vs. control). 
Table 27.
Total, direct, and indirect effects for condition (gene vs. control) on economic 
sacrifice 
Effect SE 95% CI
Total effect 1.9320 .3565 1.2267, 2.6373
Direct effect 1.3701 .3550 .6676, 2.0725
Unstandardized indirect effect 0.5619 .1581 .2783, .8766
Standardized indirect effect 0.1257 .0336 .0649, .1918
Focusing next on trust, we examined whether fusion mediated the effect of 
experience vs. control. As seen in Table 28 below, the confidence intervals for the 
indirect effect was entirely above zero for the effect of condition (experience vs. 
control) on trust. There was no direct effect of condition (experience vs. control). 
Table 28.
Total, direct, and indirect effects for condition (experience vs. control) on trust 
Effect SE 95% CI
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Total effect 1.1716 .2861 .6055, 1.7378
Direct effect 0.1870 .3199 -.4462, .8202
Unstandardized indirect effect 0.9847 .2163 .5462, 1.4412
Standardized indirect effect 0.2891 .0564 .1712, .3958
We next examined whether fusion mediated the effect of gene vs. control on 
trust. As seen in Table 29 below, the confidence intervals for the indirect effect was 
entirely above zero for the effect of condition (gene vs. control) on economic 
sacrifice. There was no direct effect of condition (gene vs. control). 
Table 29.
Total, direct, and indirect effects for condition (gene vs. control) on trust
Effect SE 95% CI
Total effect 0.7752 .2852 .2108, 1.3395
Direct effect 0.1325 .2593 -.3806, .6456
Unstandardized indirect effect 0.6427 .1482 .3699, .9508
Standardized indirect effect 0.1937 .0423 .1161, .2783
Ancillary Analyses
Having demonstrated that shared experiences lead to fusion we also examined 
whether the nature of the shared experience mattered. Specifically, whether it was 
participants who wrote about dysphoric experiences that were especially likely to feel 
fused when imagining another person who had shared that experience. Furthermore, 
according to theories of costly signaling, it is possible that people felt fused with 
others who shared self-sacrificial experiences, rather than simply dysphoric 
experiences. To this end, two researchers rated the personal experience essays on 
three dimensions: “how dysphoric this person’s experience was”, “how euphoric this 
person’s experience was”, and “Does this person’s experience demonstrate a 
willingness to self-sacrifice for others?”. Each of these questions were rated on a scale
from 1 (not at all) to 10 (very much so).
Ratings for each dimension were moderately to strongly correlated across the two 
raters (dysphoria: r(64)=.83, P<.001; euphoria: r(64)=.58, P<.001; self-sacrifice: 
r(64)=.78, P<.001). As such, a mean score was calculated from both ratings and 
correlated with fusion. This revealed that the extent to which the personal experience 
was rated as dysphoric was significantly correlated with fusion, r(64)=.27, P=.033, 
marginally correlated with economic sacrifice, r(64)=.21, P=.092, but uncorrelated 
with trust, r(64)=.07, P=.586. Ratings for experiences rated as euphoric were 
marginally and negatively correlated with fusion, r(64)=-.22, P=.075, and were 
negatively although non-significantly correlated with economic sacrifice, r(64)=-.20, 
P=.117, but were also uncorrelated with trust, r(64)=-.10, P=.455. Ratings for 
experiences considered as self-sacrifice did not correlate with any of the dependent 
variables (fusion: r(64)=-.11, P=.397; economic sacrifice: r(64)=.09, P=.491; trust: 
r(64)=-.09, P=.463).
These ancillary analyses point to the importance of shared dysphoric 
experiences in producing fusion. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, euphoric 
experiences tended to have the opposite effects. 
Discussion
The findings indicate that both shared experiences and shared genes lead to a 
tendency to feel fused with another person, but that shared experiences appear to be a 
27
more powerful trigger for fusion than shared genes. Nonetheless, both shared 
experiences and shared genes predict the tendency to make economic sacrifices on 
behalf of another person and to trust that other person. Moreover, the tendency to feel 
fused with that person helps to explain this relationship – sharing experiences or 
genes with other people increases prosocial behavior and trust due to feelings of 
fusion. Importantly, the evidence suggests that fusion plays a more important role in 
translating shared experiences into economic sacrifices, than for shared genes. In the 
case of shared genes, fusion only partially explains prosocial behavior, suggesting that
other factors are also playing a role. In the case of trust, however, fusion appears to 
play an equally important role in translating shared experiences and shared genes into 
a tendency to trust another individual.
Study 8
Method
Participants
Five hundred and six participants (280 females and 226 males, Mage=55.22, SD=6.76) 
participated in this study. The 260 MZ twins and 246 DZ same-sex twins were 
recruited from the Murcia Twin Registry (MTR; Ordoñana et al., 2013); the MTR 
accurately determines zygosity via a standard 12-item questionnaire.
Procedure
Participants responded to a brief questionnaire administered by telephone including 
measures of shared experiences, and fusion with his/her twin. Participants responded 
to all these questions on an 11-point scale, anchored at 0 (completely disagree) and 10
(completely agree). 
Shared experiences were rated with a single item: 
Through their life, some siblings experience difficult events. To what extent did 
you share these kinds of experiences with your twin. 
Fusion with the twin was measured by a 3-items reduced and adapted scale from 
Gómez et al. (2011), (Cronbach’s α=.74):
1. I am one with my twin.
2. I´ll do for my twin more than any of my other family members would do.
3. My twin is stronger because of me”.
Results
Descriptive statistics for dizygotic and monozygotic twins respectively are as follows:
Table 30.
Dizygotic Twins. Descriptive statistics for shared experiences and fusion with the 
twin.
Variable Skew (SE) Kurt. (SE) α M (SD)
Shared experiences -1.257 
(.155)
.726 (.309) -- 7.810 (2.799)
Fusion with the twin -.621 (.155) .151 (.309) .729 6.957 (2.174)
Table 31.
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Monozygotic Twins. Descriptive statistics for shared experiences and fusion with the 
twin.
Variable Skew (SE) Kurt. (SE) α M (SD)
Shared experiences -1.754 
(.151)
2.463 (.301) -- 8.480 (2.393)
Fusion with the twin -.848 (.151) -.017 (.301) .737 7.891 (1.917)
To examine the relationship between the two predictor variables—zygosity and shared
experiences—a t-test was run, which showed that zygosity predicted shared 
experiences, t(504)=2.93, P=.004. Nevertheless, a linear regression with both terms 
entered simultaneously showed that both zygosity and shared experiences 
independently predicted fusion, b=.755 (SE=.173) 95% CI [.415, 1.094] and b=.267 
(SE=.033) 95% CI [.202, .332] respectively.
As a further test of Hypothesis 5—that is, to determine the relative contributions of 
zygosity and shared experiences—we conducted two successive linear regressions 
(i.e., a hierarchical regression analysis; see Table 32). In the first regression (Model 1 
below), zygosity was the predictor and fusion the outcome. In the second regression, 
shared experiences was added to the model as a predictor (Model 2). As shown in the 
table below, Model 2 which includes shared experiences as a predictor explains more 
variance in the fusion outcome than Model 1 (see R2 and F statistics). This suggests 
that the shared experiences variable uniquely predicts fusion beyond the effect of 
zygosity. 
Table 32. 
Summary of hierarchical regression analyses for variables predicting fusion with the 
twin (N=506).
Model 1 Model 2
Variable b SE b b SE b
Zygosity .934 .182 .755 .173
Shared Experiences .267 .033
ΔR2 .050 .109
F for ΔR2 26.316** 65.164**
Note: Shared experiences was mean-centered. ΔR2 = change in R2 . F for ΔR = F-test 
for change in R2 .
**P<.001.
To further examine the relative contributions of zygosity and shared experiences, we 
conducted another hierarchical regression, but this time shared experiences was 
entered as the first predictor (see Table 33). Zygosity was added in the second. The 
results further support the hypothesis that the shared experiences variable is a stronger
predictor of fusion than zygosity, as indicated by Model 1’s R2 = .127, the highest R2 
value out of both hierarchical regressions reported in Table 32 and 33. 
Table 33. 
Summary of hierarchical regression analyses for variables predicting fusion with the 
twin (N=506).
Model 1 Model 2
Variable b SE b b SE b
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Shared Experiences .285 .033 .267 .033
Zygosity .755 .173
ΔR2 .127 .032
F for ΔR2 73.154** 19.055**
Note: Shared experiences was mean-centered.
**P<.001.
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